;'Hull Cokt o';, il was said, "is no longer the Cokroaminoto of old" '1 There were allegations of corruption against the party leadership, financial management was weak and ineffective. The bulk of the party,s 20,000-odd members were purely nominal and inanimate, ir, ,o*" places its numbers were in decline, and the party was notably unsuccessful in establishing institutions like cooperatives and Studia Islamikr, VoI. 16 , No 1, 2009 unions to improve the economic circumstances of the masses. 2 As well, Indonesian Islamists were only slowly coming to terms with the dismal reality of the final collapse of the pan-Islamic caliphate movement inI927. 3 The greatest challenge confronting the psl and Islamism in general, however, was the sudden emergence and surging popularity of the arresting new idea of Indonesia: the notion that the territory of the Netherlands East Indies was a modern nation-in-becoming and that it should be free from the grip of Dutch colonialism. That idea had developed only slowly through the 1910s and had previously been expressed most unequivocally amongst the tiny group of Indonesian students in the Netherlands and latlr in a smill fllrn:
ber of study clubs at home.a It became firmry institutionalised only in7927 with the founding of sukarno's Indonesian National party (Perserikatan (later Partai) Nasional Indonesia -pND. Growing consciousness of the national, combined with the simple, deeplv atl tractive idea of freedom, inevitably meant that the -"rrug"^oi th" idea of Indonesia was cast in terms of broad inclusiveness and unity based solely upon commitment to the imagined nation. As sukarno himself put it, "the existence of different languages and religions need be no hindrance to the forming of a nation".s Indeed, he mad.e it clear that the PNI "would be closed to religion, because [ Islam and politics was difficult to draw" . 232 In October \937,P9IJ announced that although "the P.S.I.L has for a considerable time in its activities held itself aside from the national movements", it had come to the conclusion that "such separation appears to be less useful for the 'Indonesian' people's movement in general". Accordingly, it had determined to reconnect "in order to work together with the national movements" .233 By the end of 1937, an initiativo by Abikusno with Sutomo's Parindra had resulted in the idea of an Indonesian National Congress, "a place for consultation by the whole people".23a That collaboration was " a symptom of the inclination for cooperation between a religious political group and a pure nationalist one".235 Sutomo himself remarked on "the good understanding and cooperation which now exists between Parindra and other parties, for example, the Indonesian People's Movement (Gerindo) and the Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party".236
It was itself a consequence of the dire political situation in which the general Indonesian movement had found itself in its quest for an independent Indonesia.237 It was formalised in April-1938 as Badan Perantaraan Partai-partai Politik Indonesia (Liasion Board of Indonesian Political Parties -Bapeppi), and included as well the staunchly secularist Gerindo and the ethnically-based West Java association Pasundan; each of the four parties "represent[ing] a specific group or stream". 238 Bapeppi sought "the development of cooperation between the Indonesian PoliticalParties";23e as Abikusno remarked, "the nation must be educated in the idea of working together".2a0 But Bapeppi, while it was open to non-indigenous organisations (unlike the old PPPKI), was rent by jealousies and fears; it enjoyed little success and lasted less than a year.2al Moreover, there were still voices within the PSII which championed exclusivism; one PSII party leader in Palembang remarked that "the political, economic and social hijrah means that this party will have nothing to do with anything which is not in accord with the regulations of Islam given in the Qt)t'ar." .242 Another and more successful effort at mutual engagement saw the appearance of a federation of parties, Gapi ( for the Indies.2a3 Its emergence signalled even more strongly that the old issue of cooperation or non-cooperation had sagged in relevance, especially given the increasingly threatening international situation and the emerging, slight, possibility that the Dutch might be amenable to cooperating in incremental reform, notably the formation of a responsible parliament for the Indies.2af Gapi included the four major parties-notwithstanding Salim' s reservations that such an alliance would restrain the political freedom of Muslim parties2as-as well as PII, Persatuan Minahasa (Minahasa Union), and Persatuan Politiek Katholiek Indonesia, but non-indigenous organisations were not permitted to join. Gapi was not intended to pursue ideological unification, but rather "unity of action in matters which are thought important from the point of view of the community and which the community needs'{.246 Its aim, as expressed in its statutes, was "to implement the ideals of the Indonesian people".2a7
The PSII was an especially strong supporter of the notion of a parliament.2as In Abikusno's view, "Islam teaches that the world was created for [ to inject an Islamic sensibility into political discourse.2sa Less nuanced was the view of the Persis figure Sabirin, 
